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By David Hearne, Centre for Brexit Studies 
In light of extremely challenging parliamentary arithmetic, Theresa 
May has begun her attempts to ‘sell’ the ‘deal’ she has reached with 
the EU. Unfortunately, the letter reinforces widespread 
misconceptions of both exactly what a “deal” is and what the 
agreement reached with the EU actually says. The letter claims that, 
“Today, I am in Brussels with the firm intention of agreeing a Brexit 
deal with the leaders of the other 27 EU nations. 
She then goes on to state that, 
“We will take back control of our borders, by putting an end to the free 
movement of people once and for all. 
“Instead of an immigration system based on where a person comes 
from, we will build one based on the skills and talents a person has to 
offer. 
She goes on to talk about the UK’s contribution to the EU budget, 
control over coastal waters and the legal framework for EU legislation. 
The letter has been roundly criticised from many quarters, but in this 
blog I’d like to come at it from a slightly different angle. The reality is 
that the deal agreed does none of the things the letter claims. It never 
could. 
This is because there is not one but two agreements that need to be 
negotiated. The first is simply a legal framework to ensure an orderly 
withdrawal of the UK from the EU, whilst the second maps out what 
the UK’s future relationship with the EU will look like. What has been 
agreed is the first of these: the Withdrawal Agreement. 
In very practical terms, this simply covers practical questions 
of how the UK withdraws from the EU. The first, key, thing that this 
does is establish a rather euphemistically named “transition period”. 
The term “transition” is something of a misnomer as it implies that 
during this period the UK will be moving from one state to another. 
In reality, in most important ways, the status quo will continue to apply 
until at least the end of 2020 (there is provision to extend the 
‘transition’ period), although the UK will no longer have a vote on any 
EU issues. This means that, until the end of 2020, all EU rules and 
regulations will continue to apply to the UK. The UK will remain bound 
by the Court of Justice of the EU and freedom of movement will 
continue to apply. People will wake up on 30th March 2019 and 
nothing will have changed. 
Almost all of the fundamental issues dealt with in Theresa May’s letter 
relate not to the Withdrawal Agreement but to the second agreement 
on what the UK’s future relationship with the EU will look like. This has 
not been agreed (indeed, negotiations have barely started). All that 
has been published is a political statement outlining what the two 
sides might like their future relationship to look like. In other 
words, none of these fundamental questions have been answered. 
What kind of relationship does the UK want with the EU? If the UK 
wants to participate in EU agencies (and both Theresa May and 
common sense suggest that it probably should) then there will be a 
price attached. How much (and whether any other conditions are 
attached) is all to be negotiated. Fishing rights are up for grabs. 
Perhaps the UK will be willing to offer freedom of movement in order 
to secure a frictionless border with the rest of the EU. All of this is 
unanswered in the Withdrawal Agreement, and all is yet to be 
negotiated. 
As Winston Churchill once said in a very different context, “[T]his is 
not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, 
the end of the beginning.” 
Epilogue: What the Agreement Does 
Much of the Agreement deals with practical issues, many of which are 
not contentious. For example, what happens to goods shipped from 
the UK on 31st December 2020 (during the transition when the UK 
remains, to most intents and purposes, a de facto EU member) but 
which arrive in another EU state on 1st Jan 2021 (after the transition 
has ended)? The Withdrawal Agreement answers such questions in a 
common-sense fashion, ensuring a consistent legal framework. 
Some of the things addressed are more contentious. How much does 
the UK owe the EU to cover the remainder of the long-term 
obligations that we signed up to as a member? And how much should 
the EU reduce this bill by to account for the UK’s share of certain EU 
assets. The Withdrawal Agreement gives the framework to answer 
this question (although the exact figure will not be known for many 
years). 
The Withdrawal Agreement also lays out how both sides will treat 
people who moved when the UK was an EU member (and those who 
will move before the end of the transition period). EU citizens who 
have made the UK their home (and UK citizens who have moved to 
the EU) will be allowed to remain, as expected, but the Withdrawal 
Agreement specifies exactly what processes will be put in place to 
facilitate this. It also deals with corner cases, such as when spouses 
might choose to move after the end of the Withdrawal Agreement and 
when an EU national is married to a non-EU national etc. The process 
is not fool proof and there will undoubtedly be snags, but it does at 
least exist. 
Finally, there are a number of ‘protocols’. These address Northern 
Ireland, Gibraltar and the UK’s military bases (Akrotiri and Dhekelia) in 
Cyprus. Far and away the most contentious is that on Northern 
Ireland. It is important to note, however, that the Protocol of this 
agreement will only come into force in the event that no future 
partnership agreement is agreed by the time the transition period 
ends. 
The Protocol commits Northern Ireland to following a significant 
amount of EU legislation in order to ensure that there is no visible 
border on the island of Ireland. In practice, therefore, the Court of 
Justice of the EU will continue to act as the ultimate legal arbiter (in 
certain areas) in at least one part of the UK. The whole of the UK will 
also remain in a customs union with the EU (whereby we must charge 
the same tariffs on goods coming into the UK that the EU charges) 
until a future partnership is agreed. Moreover, there are a number of 
“non-derogation” clauses designed to stop the UK from “backsliding” 
in areas such as environmental protections and labour rights. This is 
in order to ensure that, in the event of talks breaking down, the UK 
cannot undercut EU standards in order to gain a perceived ‘unfair’ 
competitive advantage (as in a customs union the EU cannot levy 
tariffs on UK products). 
 
